In June, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the case of JDB, a teenager from North Carolina who was adjudicated delinquent for his role in several break-ins and thefts. JDB made several statements to police during an interrogation without receiving a Miranda warning. The North Carolina courts held that a Miranda warning was not necessary because a reasonable person would have felt free to leave the interrogations. The Supreme Court, however, found that the North Carolina courts should have accounted for JDB being a juvenile when deciding whether he would have felt reasonably free to leave.
JDB, a thirteen-year old boy from Chapel Hill, North Carolina was questioned by police when he was seen in a neighborhood where two home break-ins occurred and several items were reported stolen. Police also spoke to JDB's grandmother who was his legal guardian.
Soon thereafter, police learned that a digital camera matching the description of one stolen during one of the break-ins was found at JDB's school and seen in his possession. Investigator DiCostanzo, a juvenile investigator with the local police force, was assigned the case.
Five days after the initial break-ins, DiCostanzo contacted the school resource officer (a police officer liaison detailed to JDB's school), the assistant principal, and an administrative intern at JDB's school and notified them that he wanted to question JDB about the break-ins. The uniformed school resource officer removed JDB from his class and brought him to a conference room where DiCostanzo, the assistant principal and the intern were waiting. The uniformed school resource officer stayed for the interview.
JDB was not given a Miranda warning. No attempt was made to contact JDB's grandmother, and JDB was not given the opportunity to speak to his grandmother. JDB was not told he was free to leave. The interview began with a discussion of sports and JDB's life, but the subject matter eventually shifted to the break-ins and a stolen camera. The assistant principal told JDB to "do the right thing," because "the truth always comes out in the end."
JDB asked if he would still be in trouble if he returned the items. DiCostanzo said the matter would go to a court, but that returning the items might help. DiCostanzo explained that he might have to seek a secure custody order to send JDB to a juvenile detention facility unless he was convinced that JDB would commit no more break-ins.
At this point JDB confessed and DiCostanzo then informed JDB he was free to leave or refuse to answer questions. JDB indicated that he understood, disclosed the location of some stolen goods, and eventually wrote a statement. JDB was allowed to take the school bus home that afternoon.
Later, two juvenile petitions were filed against JDB. JDB's attorney moved to suppress the statements made because he was "interrogated by police in a custodial setting without being afforded Miranda warning[s]."
Established precedent holds that Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is in custody. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). Precedent also explains that there are two factors to consider in making a custody determination for an interrogated individual: "first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
The trial court denied the motion, deciding that JDB was not in custody during the schoolhouse interrogation and that his statements were voluntary. JDB entered a transcript of admission to four counts against him but renewed his objection to the denial of his motion to suppress. The court adjudicated JDB delinquent.
The matter was appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed. The Supreme Court of North Carolina also affirmed on appeal. The matter was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which decided to review whether age must be considered when determining whether a juvenile suspect is in custody or not for Mirandizing purposes.
The Supreme Court held that a child's age, in some cases, would play an important role in determining whether the child would reasonably feel free to terminate the interview, noting that "[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults."
In this specific case, the Supreme Court explained that it would be inappropriate to make a custody determination of how a reasonable adult would perceive "being removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a uniformed school resource officer; being encouraged by his assistant principal to ‘do the right thing'; and being warned by a police investigator of the prospect of juvenile detention and separation from his guardian and primary caretaker[.]" Instead, considering how a child of JDB's age would perceive the matter is the appropriate analysis. That JDB was at school instead of the police department was of little consequence, given that a student "whose presence at school is compulsory and whose disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary action" would not necessarily feel free to simply end an interrogation or walk out.
Since "children are most susceptible to influence . . . and outside pressures" and the law allows for consideration of age in determining what a reasonable person would do, the Supreme Court concluded that it is appropriate to consider the age of juveniles when analyzing whether or not they would reasonably feel free to leave an interrogation and thus whether or not they are in custody.
The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the North Carolina courts for a reassessment of whether a child such as JDB was in custody under the facts presented.
The full decision can be read here.
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