Omar Lewis was in a group of four men. Police officers approached the group and asked if any had firearms. Lewis did not respond, but two others replied in the affirmative. The police detained all four men. It was later discovered that Lewis was an alien in possession of a firearm, even though police did not have any particularized suspicion that Lewis had broken any law. The court of appeals found that law enforcement officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they briefly detained Lewis.
At 8:50 pm on February 6, 2009, Omar Lewis, Carlos Evans, Charles McRae, and another individual were standing in the parking lot of a Seawinds restaurant in the Pine Hills area of Orange County, Florida. Pine Hills was known to local law enforcement to be a high-crime area with a high rate of gun- and drug-related crimes. The four men were talking and looking through the trunk of their vehicle during business hours. Although the men had parked outside of a designated parking spot, this was not a criminal offense in Florida.
Deputies Noel Bojko and Scott Stiles noticed that the men were moving computer equipment around in the trunk of the vehicle, an activity which they found unusual, but agreed amongst themselves was insufficient to conclude that a robbery or drug sale had recently occurred. Accordingly, the deputies decided to approach the men and start up a casual conversation.
The deputies approached and asked the four men something along the lines of “how is it going[?]” The men replied that they were “just hanging out in the parking lot.” The deputies then asked if any of the four men had fire arms. Up until this point, it was undisputed that the encounter was consensual. However, in response to the questions, McRae and Evans answered that they indeed had firearms while Lewis and the other man said nothing; the deputies immediately drew their weapons and ordered all of the men to sit on the ground and show their hands. At this point, it was undisputed that the encounter was no longer consensual and the men had been seized.
Three of the men complied immediately with the order to put their hands up. Evans explained that his firearm was in the trunk of the vehicle and not on his person. McRae explained that he had a concealed firearm in his waistband and later in the encounter would produce a valid carry and conceal license. However, Lewis shuffled around for approximately ten seconds before complying and sitting near the other men.
Around this time, Corporal Steven Jenny arrived on the scene and noticed Lewis looking extremely nervous. The officers then noticed an automatic pistol near the area where Lewis had been “scooting” around. The officers had not observed Lewis discard the weapon but concluded that he was the only individual who could have discarded the weapon at that location. Subsequent testing would reveal Lewis’ DNA on the firearm.
Lewis was arrested for a violation of a Florida firearms statute. It was subsequently discovered that Lewis was an alien and the state charges were dropped in favor of prosecution under a federal law making it illegal for an alien to carry firearms.
While facing trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Lewis challenged the evidence against him in a suppression motion. The district court concluded that, as McRae and Evans had apparently lawfully possessed their firearms, the officers had no cause to detain any of the men and that, in any event, the officers had no particularized suspicion that Lewis had engaged in any crime and thus lacked authority to detain him. Accordingly, the district court suppressed the evidence against Lewis.
The Government appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed the suppression ruling.
The court of appeals found that the district court had applied an improper standard of review. Once McRae and Evans had admitted that they had firearms, police officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the men briefly on suspicion of violating state firearms laws. The fact that police would later discover that McRae and Evans were lawfully carrying their weapons was irrelevant – in a moment of heightened risk, and where officers had a reasonable belief the law may be broken, the officers were able to initiate a stop in order to resolve any ambiguity in whether the law was broken.
The court of appeals also rejected the logic that in this group setting, the officers needed particularized suspicion toward Lewis himself. As officers believed they faced substantial immediate danger in light of two individuals claiming to possess firearms, they could use their discretion to briefly detain all involved individuals, even if there is only particularized suspicion to some members of the group. The court explained that “[o]nce officers had that reasonable suspicion, they were not obligated to let three of the four associated individuals walk about freely while they investigated McRae, in light of the officers’ powerful concern for their own safety.”
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling on the suppression motion and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
The case, United States v. Lewis, is available here.
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